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Contested Statelessness in Sabah, Malaysia: Irregularity and
the Politics of Recognition
Catherine Allerton
Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London,
United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
UNHCR’s current #IBelong campaign presents stateless people as
uniquely excluded, emphasizing the need for legal solutions to
their situation. Such approaches to statelessness sidestep both
the complexities of lived experience and the wider politics of
state recognition. In response, this article utilizes ethnographic
data from Sabah, Malaysia, and theorizations of the gray areas
between citizenship and statelessness to argue for the
fundamental connection between statelessness and irregularity.
Such a connection is central to understanding both the
everyday lives of potentially stateless people and Sabah’s public
discourse on statelessness as a mirage obscuring the problems
of “illegals” and “street children.”
KEYWORDS
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In 2014, statelessness was ﬁrmly re-installed on the international human rights
agenda with the introduction of UNHCR’s #IBelong campaign. This campaign,
launched 60 years after the 1954 UN General Assembly adopted the Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, plans to draw attention to statelessness
in order to eradicate the problem within 10 years (UNHCR, 2014a). UNHCR’s
campaign webpages state that in most cases people’s statelessness could be resolved
“through minor changes in existing laws,”1 and its Global Action Plan emphasizes
practical measures that states can take to reduce the numbers of stateless people.
Such measures include birth registration and the reform of nationality laws, in par-
ticular, so that otherwise stateless children can acquire the nationality of the state
in which they were born.
In Malaysia, it would seem that no such legal reform is needed. Although the
country subscribes to a jus sanguinis principle of citizenship (Razali et al., 2015,
p. 20), there are clear legal provisions to protect the status of otherwise stateless
children. The federal constitution allows for a child born in Malaysia, who is
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“not born as citizen of another country,” and who cannot acquire citizenship of
another country by registration within one year of birth, to become a citizen of
Malaysia by operation of law (UNHCR, 2013, p. 2). However, in reality, Malaysian
citizenship has never been granted to a child on such terms (Razali, 2014). For
example, in a 2015 case, a Malaysian father’s application for citizenship for his 5-
year-old son was rejected. Since the parents were not married at the time of the
boy’s birth, the judge stated that the boy should follow his birth mother’s national-
ity. The fact that the boy’s mother was a Thai national, who disappeared when he
was 6 months old and has never been tracked down, was deemed irrelevant. The
judge ruled that the boy (who had lived all his life in Malaysia) could apply for
Thai citizenship and was therefore not a stateless child (Ho Kit Yen, 2015).
This and other similar cases highlight how, in Malaysia, statelessness as an
issue is always embroiled in wider moral and political arguments, whether
these concern mixed relationships, the status of children born out of wedlock,
or (as we shall see) the question of “illegals.” Thus, even though laws exist to
apparently prevent child statelessness, in practice, the path toward Malaysian
citizenship for potentially stateless children is unlikely to be straightforward.
Whilst approaches such as the #IBelong campaign that emphasize practical,
technical measures to reduce statelessness are important, they will be ineffec-
tive in a country such as Malaysia if not backed up by political will. This is
because, as I shall argue, statelessness is fundamentally an issue of (social,
moral, and political) recognition and is not simply a question of the lack of
citizenship (cf. Somers, 2008). An essential part of the analysis of contexts of
and remedies for statelessness must therefore be an exploration of the moral
and political claims surrounding the issue.
This article focuses on statelessness as an ambiguous and contested issue in
the East Malaysian state of Sabah. This is a state in the north of the island of
Borneo with very high numbers of migrant workers, where thousands of peo-
ple, particularly children, have been described as being at risk of statelessness
(Tenaganita, 2006). The article draws on ﬁeldwork with the children of
migrants and refugees in Sabah’s capital, Kota Kinabalu, and uses a two-
pronged analysis to explore the politics of recognition in the state. Firstly, the
article focuses on the lived experiences of refugee and migrant families, draw-
ing out the fundamental vulnerability of irregularity in this context, and sug-
gesting that the tenor of contemporary anti-statelessness campaigns does not
reﬂect the problems and priorities of such families. Secondly, the article ana-
lyzes certain political debates and media discourses on stateless people in
Sabah, exploring two factors that work against recognition: the presentation of
statelessness as a nonissue and the assumption that stateless children are
“street children.” Thus, the article shows how even acknowledging the exis-
tence of statelessness in Sabah is highly contentious, reﬂecting not only the
political context, but also problems with the analytical category of “stateless
persons.”
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Statelessness, citizenship, and recognition
One explicit focus of current UNHCR campaigns is to have more states become
parties to the 1954 and the 1961 Conventions on Statelessness (UNHCR, 2014a,
pp. 23–24). These conventions were a response to the stateless refugees of mid-
20th century Europe, whose condition illuminated how “natural rights” counted
for little in the absence of citizenship. It was Hannah Arendt, in The Origins of
Totalitarianism, who ﬁrst theorized the problem of statelessness in relation to these
refugees. Arendt argued that statelessness entailed three losses: the loss of a home,
the loss of government protection, and the loss of the “mutual recognition neces-
sary for a political life” (Gibney, 2011, p. 50), what Arendt famously called the
“right to have rights” (1968, p. 296). Arendt saw that the precondition for exercis-
ing human rights was the prior right of inclusion; this is what made the refugees’
loss of “mutual recognition”—in Somers’s terms their “ontological dehumaniza-
tion” (2008, p. 16)—so devastating.
However, although Arendt’s move to put the noncitizen at the center of political
thought remains powerful, more recent work on statelessness and citizenship ques-
tions the picture of pure exclusion that she presents and that seems so inﬂuential in
current UNHCR campaigns. For example, in her subtle analysis of the situation of
“Urdu-speakers” living in camp and noncamp situations in Bangladesh, Redclift
questions the utility of abstract oppositions of “statelessness” and “citizenship.”
Statelessness, Redclift argues, cannot be reduced to “a singular, or discrete, legal or
social form” and does not tell a story “solely of exclusion” (2013a, p. 6; cf. Sigona,
2016). Focusing on Urdu-speakers’ lived experience (rather than abstract theoriza-
tions) reveals that “stateless people” can access rights, just as “citizens” can at times
be denied rights. Redclift also argues that the inﬂuence of Agamben’s (2005) lan-
guage of “exception,” which surrounds many contemporary analyses of refugees
and displacement, “suppresses a political reading of the camp” (Redclift, 2013b, p.
309) and presents a “rather ﬂattened” understanding of “stateless” and migrant
populations (Redclift, 2013b, p. 312).
In arguing that “citizenship is about more than citizenship law” (2013a, p. 112),
Redclift draws on the growing sociology of citizenship and, in particular, Isin and
Nielsen’s argument that a proper understanding of citizenship requires a focus on
those “acts” in which “subjects constitute themselves as citizens” (2008, p. 2).
Recent work within this ﬁeld has explored the implications of migrant and nonciti-
zen “acts of citizenship,” including antideportation campaigns (Nyers, 2003),
migrant counterconducts in the United States (Inda, 2011), and migrant activism
at the Calais camp in France (Rygiel, 2011). Signiﬁcantly, for the concerns of this
article, Redclift argues for the need to bring the study of statelessness and “irregu-
larity” together. Both statelessness and irregularity, she argues, are often presented
as “a social or legal status that an individual holds,” whereas in reality both are bet-
ter considered as unstable, ambivalent conditions that individuals can move “in
and out of,” and may contest (Redclift, 2013a, p. 7; cf. Squire, 2011). Crucially,
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Redclift notes that for both irregular migrants and “stateless” people, what is most
important is not necessarily formal status but, rather, “rights, mobility and belong-
ing” (Redclift, 2013a, p. 113). Although international campaigns tend to focus on
the de jure stateless, their practical situation shares much in common with de facto
stateless irregular migrants, who exist as “precarious residents” in the state where
they make their lives (Gibney, 2011, p. 52).
By blurring the boundaries of citizenship and statelessness, the sociology of citi-
zenship demonstrates how noncitizens can make claims to belonging through var-
ied “acts of citizenship.” By contrast, the work of Somers (2008) shows how people
with de jure citizenship can, through social exclusion, lose “meaningful member-
ship” of their state. By exploring the contemporary “contractualization” of citizen-
ship, Somers has argued that people “with nothing to offer”—most notoriously,
the poor U.S. victims of Hurricane Katrina—can be “denied moral recognition”
and rights “because they have no worth” (2008, p. 89). Such people effectively end
up as “stateless citizens” in their own country. Somers’s work reinvigorates
Arendt’s conception of citizenship as the right to have rights with a more political
understanding of the moral and social recognition that rights claims involve (Redc-
lift, 2013a, p. 170). This emphasis on (lack of) recognition and the moral responsi-
bilities of states is also seen in Gibney’s (2014) theorization of the stateless as
“unrecognized members” of the state in which they reside. In a powerful argument
that, I shall show, has clear relevance to the Sabah case, Gibney argues that the
injustice experienced by most stateless people is not some general lack of citizen-
ship, but the fact that the speciﬁc state with which they have “deep connections”
does not recognize their “moral claim to membership” (2014, p. 58).
If statelessness is, fundamentally, a question of states’ lack of moral recognition
of all their members, then “solving” statelessness is clearly a deeply political task,
that must in part involve honesty about the political uses of statelessness by states
(Gibney, 2014, pp. 53–57). Yet, in the current UNHCR campaign, the main “solu-
tions” put forward for statelessness emphasize “identiﬁcation” procedures and
reform to nationality laws (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016, p. 302). Such “solutions”
draw on the rhetoric of what Reddy (2015) calls “legal triumphalism,” according to
which law is an autonomous sphere with almost magical force, giving it the ability
to transcend considerations of power, prejudice, and inequality. Within the terms
of such legal triumphalism, argues Reddy, identiﬁcation is reduced to documenta-
tion; that is, documents are given the power to “prove” identity. However, as this
article explores, in many contexts, statelessness is not just an issue of legal identiﬁ-
cation but is embroiled in contentious politics of national and regional belonging.
Research context and methods
Migration and irregularity in Sabah
Sabah, once part of the Sultanate of Sulu, has long been a place of mixtures and
migrations (see Figure 1). However, such ﬂows have increased markedly since the
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1970s and 1980s. Firstly, between 1972 and 1977, a separatist war in the southern
Philippines forced about 100,000 people to ﬂee to Sabah (Kassim, 2009, p. 58).
These Muslim Filipinos were recognized as refugees by UNHCR, given basic hous-
ing in resettlement villages, and initially received special permission to stay and
Figure 1. Map of Sabah island in Southeast Asia, with inserts showing sending locations of (A)
Filipino and (B) Indonesian migrants.
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work from Sabah’s chief minister (Kassim, 2009, pp. 57–58). Secondly, several of
Sabah’s key industries and services, including rural oil palm plantations, have been
dependent on migrant labor (mostly Filipino and Indonesian) for decades. Sabah
has the highest population growth rate and the highest proportion of “foreign”
workers of any Malaysian state. Ofﬁcial population statistics put Sabah’s 2015 pop-
ulation at just over 3.5 million, of whom 870,400 were “non-citizens.”2 However,
such ofﬁcial statistics do not include Sabah’s high numbers of undocumented
workers or their dependents.
Foreign workers are often “demonized” in Sabah (Majid Cooke & Mulia, 2012,
p. 152) and are subject to an increasingly restrictive set of immigration regulations.
Migrant workers are meant to be temporary, are expected to move into or out of
the country as required and are “in no way meant to integrate into Malaysian soci-
ety” (Gurowitz, 2000, p. 867). There is no provision for permanent employment,
and the permit system presupposes short-term contracts that “chain” workers to a
particular employer (Pye, Daud, Harmono, & Tatat, 2012, p. 331). Unskilled and
semiskilled workers are not allowed to bring their families with them to Malaysia
and female domestic workers found to be pregnant are subject to rapid deportation
(Chin, 1997, p. 371). Male workers may not marry local women, and children of
migrants (who should not be in Malaysia) are unable to access health care or
attend government schools (Pye et al., 2012, p. 332).
One inevitable consequence of such immigration policies and procedures is that
many migrants and their children choose, are born into, fall into or are forced into
(through the actions of their employers) irregularity. Many undocumented work-
ers in Sabah are protected by what Idrus (2008, p. 156) describes as a system of
“mutual illegal collaboration” between agents, police, and employers. However,
during the regular public “crackdowns” in the state, such collaborative protection
fails and workers and their families are detained and often subsequently deported
(Nah, 2007, p. 45). Even former refugees, who were issued with a temporary pass
known as IMM13 and are now categorized by UNHCR as “people of concern,”
may ﬁnd their families slipping into irregularity (Kassim, 2009, p. 69).
Methods
This article draws on qualitative data collected during a year of ﬁeldwork research
in Kota Kinabalu (KK) from August 2012 to August 2013. Research focused on the
children of Filipino and Indonesian refugees and migrants, exploring issues of
identity, illegality, belonging, potential statelessness, education, and work. Access
to such children was initially secured through teachers and other adults working at
or living close to informal learning centers in the city. In all, I paid 182 visits to
such centers: 101 visits to four mostly “Indonesian” centers and 81 visits to ﬁve
mostly “Filipino” centers. My role at these centers varied, depending on the center
setup, and the needs of the volunteer teachers. At three centers, one of which was
Indonesian (40 visits) and two of which were Filipino (25 and 35 visits,
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respectively), I worked as a volunteer English teacher. At three centers that I visited
less frequently (5, 7, and 9 visits each) and at KK’s only ofﬁcial Indonesian school
(33 visits), I mostly observed lessons and chatted with students during their break,
whilst at one understaffed Indonesian center (23 visits), I was encouraged to utilize
some sheltered outdoor space to involve children in different research exercises.
For comparative purposes, I also visited two learning centers outside of the city:
one on an offshore island with a large squatter settlement and one in an interior
town with high number of immigrants working in the timber trade.
Through these visits, I collected information on 338 children in KK, aged 8 to
18 years, 191 of whom had at least one parent of Indonesian origin and 147 of whom
had at least one parent or grandparent of Filipino origin. Fieldwork was conducted in
the local language, Malay, as an individual researcher and, in addition to participant
observation, drew on a variety of mixed methods. Questionnaires were used to collect
information on all children’s backgrounds and family setup, with children conveying
information verbally or in their own writing. At the centers I visited most frequently, I
also utilized several methods that have been proven to be particularly “child-friendly”
(Punch, 2002). These included drawing, spider diagrams, mapmaking, group discus-
sions, and open-ended worksheets encouraging children to reﬂect on, for example, dif-
ferences between life in Indonesia versus life in Sabah. One hundred ﬁfty-six children
participated in four or more (in 54 cases, 10 or more) of these different activities, and
46 children wrote “holiday diaries.” In the later stages of the ﬁeldwork, 70 children were
lent cameras and encouraged to take pictures of places, people and things that were
important to them, later describing the images for me. I also conducted 29 semistruc-
tured “life history” interviews with those teenagers I knew best, either individually or in
pairs, depending on their preference.
Though I tried to ensure that I had the same quality and type of data on Indone-
sian- and Filipino-origin children, it was otherwise difﬁcult to control the selection
of young participants. Given the vulnerability and, to a certain extent, “invisibility”
of this population, the main criteria were children’s interest in and comfort with
talking to me and the relative safety of their learning center as a research setting.
As ﬁeldwork progressed and I got to know some individual children and their
parents well, child-focused research in learning centers was supplemented with vis-
its to families at their workers’ housing or in squatter settlements. Twenty-ﬁve
parents also completed detailed questionnaires on their own and their children’s
access to education. Three local research assistants were employed for two months
purely to conduct a survey of working youth, who were otherwise difﬁcult for me
to access. The survey had 138 respondents, aged 11 to 23 (average age, 16). To give
a sense of the exclusion that it revealed: 81% of those surveyed did not have a birth
certiﬁcate and the average length of total education received was just 6 months.
One of these research assistants, a young woman of Indonesian origin, also facili-
tated visits to several factories where children of migrants worked. To protect the
identity of my research interlocutors, all names of adults and children are
pseudonyms.
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Statelessness and lived experience in Sabah
For the #IBelong campaign, “solving” statelessness must begin with the identiﬁca-
tion and counting of “stateless people.” Campaign documents attempt to create a
universal category of “the stateless” who are, in Gibney’s terms, seen as “victims of
“statelessness per se’” (2014, p. 57). However, understanding statelessness requires
understanding not only, as we have seen, how it is intimately connected to citizen-
ship but also how it is “plural and diverse,” as well as historically speciﬁc (Sigona,
2016, p. 265). In Sabah, statelessness is both unstable and highly contested. In a
context of long-term cross-border movements and impoverished migrant families,
there are no clear populations of “stateless people.” Rather, long-term exclusion
and problems in acquiring birth certiﬁcates and other documents mean that many
children are considered to be “at risk” of statelessness (Allerton, 2014; Razali,
Nordin, & Duraisingam, 2015; Tenaganita, 2006). Potential statelessness is thus
entangled with wider issues of irregularity and vulnerability. To explore this, I turn
to the lived experience of potentially stateless people, a dimension that is, with
some key exceptions (Redclift, 2013a, 2013b; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016), often miss-
ing from theorizations of statelessness.
Rozita, a young mother who was born in Sabah, was completely undocumented
and despaired of ever having any identity documents. Her Filipino father came to
Sabah as a refugee and she knew nothing about the identity of her mother, since
her parents split up when Rozita was a baby. Rozita’s father remarried and moved
to peninsular Malaysia, and Rozita was informally adopted and raised in a coastal
village outside the city by an elderly woman. Rozita told me that she thinks she did
once have a birth certiﬁcate and a copy of her father’s old passport. However, both
documents were lost in a sequence of family moves after an uncle’s death. This
kind of story of family dispersal, informal adoption, and the loss of documents was
a common one for refugee families. Rozita now ﬁnds herself without any docu-
ments, with no sense of how she might ever get any, and with four children who
all lack birth certiﬁcates. Ironically, although not ofﬁcially recognized as belonging
to (or even existing in) Sabah, Rozita works part-time, cooking meals at the gov-
ernment school that her children are unable to attend. Gibney’s approach to the
stateless as “unrecognized citizens” seems particularly apt in her case (2014, p. 60).
Although a person without a birth certiﬁcate is not necessarily stateless, birth
registration is essential to obtaining many other identity documents and is there-
fore a signiﬁcant tool in statelessness prevention. Survey and ethnographic data
collected for this research revealed that the majority of children of migrants lacked
birth certiﬁcates. In a minority of cases this may be because parents lack knowledge
of the birth registration process, but in most instances it is because they cannot
register their children’s birth without a passport or ID card or an ofﬁcial certiﬁcate
of marriage (Razali et al., 2015, p. 29). Many parents also actively avoid hospital
births due to the high costs for foreigners and the fear (for those without valid
identity documents) of being reported by hospital staff to the police (Nah, 2007,
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p. 42). Divorce, house ﬁres, theft, and scams had also led, in several cases, to a loss
of documents. One boy, Jony, told me that his Filipino mother had previously held
an IMM13 card, a form of documentation originally given to refugees (and that
allows a person to live, travel, and work in Sabah), but had been “scammed” out of
it. Although a minority of families of Indonesian or Filipino origin was fully docu-
mented and “legal,” the majority was of mixed and shifting legal status. People
moved in and out of legality and into potential statelessness from a previous situa-
tion of being documented.
Very few children or adults involved in this research had any understanding of
the idea of statelessness or saw this as relevant to their situation. Instead, they were
concerned with “having a pas”: having valid documents, of whatever form. With-
out a pas, children feared being picked up by the police during regular “checking”
operations and feared that undocumented family members might be arrested and
detained. Without a pas, it becomes hard to travel to shops to buy food, to take
children to learning centers, or to access health care. For children, irregularity
often meant conﬁnement to squatter settlements or workers’ housing. Nasira, an
undocumented Suluk teenager, told me that although she wanted to go out beyond
her squatter settlement, “If you don’t have a pas you are scared of the police and
scared of going out.”
Therefore, for most migrant and refugee families, what mattered was not neces-
sarily gaining Malaysian citizenship, but escaping irregularity. In Sabah, the desire
to “have a pas” leads to documentary pragmatism, a distinctive attitude toward
identiﬁcation documents that is likely to be common in other contexts with long-
term refugee and irregular migrant populations (cf. Redclift, 2013b, pp. 313–315).
Families attempt to tactically acquire or borrow documents in a variety of different
ways, even as these acquisitions and borrowings may have unintended and poten-
tially problematic future consequences. Being documented or undocumented does
not have any moral connotations for such families; one may be lucky or unlucky,
brave or timid in pursuing “a pas.” Similarly, Malaysian citizens may obstruct or
help with this pursuit. It is unlikely that any of the families involved in this
research would condemn the actions of a clerk who received money in relation to
late birth registration applications (Daily Express, 2013); rather, the clerk’s actions
would probably be seen as moral and useful ones, given the risks, complexities,
and politics surrounding birth registration in Sabah.
This documentary pragmatism does not necessarily link identity to documents,
contrasting with the “legal triumphalism” that credits documents with the power
to “prove” identity (Reddy, 2015, p. 4). To migrant families in Sabah, papers, cards,
permits, and passes are all things that can be acquired, lost, or stolen: they do not
necessarily reveal anything about a person’s subjective identity or the places to
which they feel they belong. In one Bugis (Indonesian) family, the son, having pre-
viously been undocumented until he was 16, now had an Indonesian passport. By
contrast, his older sister was now a Malaysian citizen, after becoming the adopted
child of a distant, citizen relative. The mixed citizenship of these siblings was not
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seen as a problem for their identity, but as a pragmatic response to an opportunity
that had arisen at a particular point in time. However, it is also the case that, in
their desire to work and survive in the city, families are at risk of exploitation from
various actors. Employers who pay regular bribes to prevent immigration raids on
their factories or workshops can use this protection as a way to keep workers docile
and to beneﬁt from the unpaid labor of grateful family members. Several of my
child and adult research participants told me that police ofﬁcers regularly collected
50 Ringgit payments from undocumented people, allowing them to escape arrest
during checking operations. Unscrupulous visa or passport agents also exploit peo-
ple’s desires to have a pas, encouraging people to make complicated and expensive
applications for documents but leaving them with nothing.
The lived experience of potential statelessness in this context can only be prop-
erly understood by considering it alongside irregularity. Take, for example, holders
of IMM13 cards. As described earlier, these were given to Filipino refugees and
could once (though no longer) be acquired by their descendants. The cards confer
a status that is legal but temporary and that is lost if the pass is stolen or not
renewed annually. The children of IMM13 cardholders are also not allowed to
attend Malaysian schools. Such documents place people, including second or third
generation refugee descendants who have never visited the Philippines, in a legal
limbo of ongoing noncitizenship. Nevertheless, many people prefer to remain in
such a potentially stateless limbo, renewing their cards each year, rather than pur-
suing the Filipino citizenship to which they might be entitled. During a document-
processing visit to a Filipino learning center in Kota Kinabalu by the Philippines
National Statistics Ofﬁce, one Suluk girl told me that her family (IMM13 cardhold-
ers with distant connections to the Philippines) would deﬁnitely not be applying for
Filipino passports (Allerton, 2014, pp. 31–32). Not only would such passports have
required them to have work permits (whereas IMM13 cards simply require
renewal) and would therefore put them at risk of irregularity, passports would also
mark them as “Filipino” rather than as unrecognized Suluk Sabahans. For this fam-
ily, what matters is not escaping statelessness (through acquiring the most easily
available citizenship) but retaining documents that recognize some kind of (tem-
porary, liminal) connection to Sabah, in the hope of holding out for the permanent
residency cards they feel they deserve.
The complex story that emerges from migrants in KK is that being at risk of
statelessness is not always the difference that makes a difference in people’s lives.
Despite UNHCR’s assertion that stateless people “face greater everyday pressures
than other groups” (UNHCR, 2014b, p. 14), in Sabah it is those in general whose
status is “irregular” who are the most vulnerable. During this research, it was
impossible to clearly distinguish “stateless children” from the wider category of
“undocumented children,” since the daily experiences of such children are very
similar (Allerton, 2014, p. 32). Both potentially stateless and currently undocu-
mented children are denied access to education and health care, both fear their
own or their family members’ arrest in “checking” raids, and both face an
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uncertain future in Sabah of perpetual “foreignness” and low-paid, unskilled work.
Just as the dichotomy of the “deserving” forced migrant versus the “undeserving”
economic migrant fails to capture the complex realities of many migrations, so too
does any juxtaposition of the “most pressurized” legally stateless versus “irregular”
migrants and their children.
Public discourse and (non)recognition of statelessness
Having described some aspects of the entangled experiences of potential stateless-
ness and irregularity in KK, this article now moves to explore the politics of state-
lessness in Sabah by examining certain public discourses in the state. As Majid
Cooke and Mulia note in their analysis of newspaper coverage of the “moral panic”
surrounding migration in Sabah, migrants are seen as “opportunists” and “cheats”
and are usefully demonized by economic and political elites (2012, p. 141). When
it comes to the potential statelessness of migrants and their descendants, two dis-
courses are prominent: ﬁrstly, a refusal to see statelessness as a Malaysian problem
and, secondly, the assertion that stateless children are “street children.” Such dis-
courses lie at the heart of Sabah’s denial of “moral recognition” (Somers, 2008, p.
89) to its potentially stateless residents and workers.
Political denial of so-called stateless people
Malaysia’s economic reliance on foreign workers has gone hand-in-hand with
opposition to their presence and an obsession with the problem of “illegals.” Under
Malaysian law, “only two categories of migrant are recognized—documented, or
‘legal,’ and undocumented, or ‘illegal’” (Hedman, 2008, p. 367). Thus, during
Malaysia’s high-proﬁle, public “crackdowns” on “illegals,” refugees lacking a recog-
nized pass, asylum seekers, and stateless people are as likely to ﬁnd themselves the
targets of arrest as undocumented economic migrants (Nah, 2011). Such sharp dis-
tinctions between “legal” and “illegal” migrants, in addition to those between
“locals” and (locally born, noncitizen) “foreigners” feed a Malaysian political dis-
course that often refuses to recognize statelessness as a problem.
In 2015, the Malaysian Home Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi
was quoted as remarking that there are in fact “no stateless people” in Malaysia
(Daily Express, 2015). In response to a question from a senator on the number of
stateless children in Sabah and government actions to deal with the issue, Zahid
argued that there could not be any stateless people in Malaysia, because no one is
allowed to enter the country “without legal travel documents.” Thus, a child of
overseas migrant workers must follow the citizenship of his or her parents, since
those parents cannot be working in Malaysia without valid documentation from
their country of origin. Zahid’s strange logic conforms entirely with ofﬁcial immi-
gration rules, even as it ignores the reliance of several major Malaysian industries
on undocumented labor or the statelessness of Malaysians of Indian descent work-
ing in peninsular plantations (Paulsen, 2012). For many politicians, then,
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statelessness is a kind of “nonproblem” in Malaysia, since it is thought to mask the
more real problem of “illegal immigrants,” who are the responsibility of other
states. This political perspective on statelessness is even more complex in Sabah,
where suspicions over so-called stateless people are connected with longer-running
political grievances concerning federal interference in Sabah’s autonomy (Lim,
2008).
In September 2012, a Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) was set up in Sabah to
inquire into the presence of immigrants in the state and to explore whether such
immigrants had been unlawfully issued with Malaysian citizenship. This Royal
Commission had long been demanded by Sabah-based political parties, who hoped
to ﬁnally clarify the existence of what is known as Project IC. This refers to allega-
tions concerning the unlawful and rapid granting of citizenship (IC, identity card)
to Muslim immigrants in previously majority-Christian Sabah as a way to bolster
electoral support for the (Malay Muslim-dominated) ruling coalition of UMNO
(Sadiq, 2005, p. 116). Project IC has been seen by many indigenous Sabahans as a
way for the federal government to alter the demographic make-up of Sabah, where
numbers of Muslims have rapidly increased, but the local (Christian) Kadazandu-
sun, Murut, and Chinese population has declined (Sadiq, 2005, p. 108).
This uniquely Sabahan political perspective on irregular migrants as potentially
illicit future citizens further clariﬁes why statelessness might be a nonissue for
many people in the state. According to those who consider there to be an ongoing
Project IC, statelessness is simply the latest ruse through which “illegal immi-
grants” may try to access Malaysian identity cards. As Somers has noted, “while
citizenship is the language of civil society, it is a language built as much … on
exclusion … as it is on inclusion and solidarity” (2008, p. 69). In Sabah it often
seemed as though there was a continual attempt to exclude migrants and their
descendants from any more regularized status. During my research, I noticed how
often Sabahans referred not to stateless people but to “so-called stateless people.”
The implication of the “so-called” preﬁx seemed to be that people who are
described as “stateless” are not really stateless and that this issue is a mirage,
obscuring other, more important issues; that is, these are “so-called” stateless peo-
ple because their apparent statelessness is simply a mask, both for illegality and for
further demographic and political engineering. Again, we are reminded that legal
and technical solutions to statelessness count for nothing without moral and politi-
cal recognition.
In December 2014, the RCI ﬁnally published its long-awaited report. This con-
ﬁrmed the existence of some form of Project IC in Sabah, though failed to blame
any particular parties and was therefore immediately criticized as having been
watered down for political purposes. Interestingly, the issue of statelessness does
appear in the report. The eighth and ﬁnal Term of Reference that the RCI Com-
missioners were charged to investigate was:
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(h) to enquire into the number of immigrants in Sabah who were issued blue identiﬁca-
tion cards or citizenship by taking into consideration their status as stateless persons.
(RCI Commissioners, 2014, p. 7)
In the evidence sections of the report, three (numbered and named) government
witnesses who gave evidence to the commissioners do brieﬂy mention statelessness
(RCI Commissioners, 2014, pp. 63, 76, 124). However, despite these witness state-
ments, in Chapter 3 of the RCI report, Assessment and Findings, term (h) of the
terms of reference is no longer listed or commented on. It seems that, even in an
apparently independent report, statelessness has disappeared as an issue worthy of
comment, reﬂecting broader political perspectives that it is a straw man, a “non-
problem” that does not require recognition.
Stateless children as “street children”
Signiﬁcantly, when the RCI report does consider stateless people, it primarily gives
space to stateless children. Moreover, such children are, quite noticeably, associated
with street children. Witness 77, Muhd. Azan bin Hussin, who runs the Children
Unit of Sabah’s Welfare Services Department, deﬁnes a stateless child as “a person
who is under 18 years old, does not have any citizenship status and [sic] without
documents.” His additional comments are entirely concerned with procedures for
housing children found “loitering” on the streets, including the eventual detention
(and presumably, deportation) of such “noncitizen” children once they reach
19 years of age (RCI Commissioners, 2014, pp. 133–134). Witness 191, Chua Choon
Hwa, from the Federal Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development,
notes that the ministry deﬁnes “street children” as “all children wondering [sic] in
the streets” (RCI Commissioners, 2014, pp. 139–140). Finally, in the Assessment
and Findings section of the report, the RCI commissioners note the signiﬁcant prob-
lem of the “children of illegal immigrants and refugees who do not have access to
even basic education and who are seen at times, to be roaming the streets causing
public nuisance etc.” (RCI Commissioners, 2014, p. 319).
The association of stateless children with street children is extremely common
in a variety of media and other reports on Sabah. Such reports tend to argue that
Sabah is dealing with a “generation of stateless children” and faces problems of
future “social unrest.” The well-known pictures of the Lost Children of Sabah, part
of photographer Greg Constantine’s Nowhere People project documenting state-
less people, predominantly focus on boys on the streets and in a market, with one
caption noting that “untold numbers of children … fend for themselves on the
streets.”3 A newspaper article arguing against giving birth certiﬁcates to stateless
children, quotes the Sabah Progressive Party President as saying that stateless chil-
dren are “street kids who had been separated from their parents,” whether because
they were abandoned or because their parents “have been detained and deported
to their countries of origin” (Rakyat Post, 2014). A more recent article in the same
newspaper on the “ticking time bomb” of stateless street children quoted Sabah
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Assemblyman Junz Wong’s comments that “the perennial problems of stateless
street kids had escalated to a new alarming height of social and security problems”
(Rakyat Post, 2016).
Ethnographic, sociological, and development-focused research with “street chil-
dren” has long explored both the difﬁculties of precisely deﬁning who counts as a
street child and the use of “street children” as a “stigmatizing label” that contrib-
utes toward negative reaction toward certain urban children (Panter-Brick, 2002,
p. 151). Such children are often deﬁned as an antisocial element and a public men-
ace, since they are seen as people “out of place”: children outside of the home and
therefore outside of the socializing control of adults. Glauser notes that the concern
with “street children” often seems to arise “because they disrupt the tranquility,
stability and normality of society” (1997, p. 153). However, there is no research in
Sabah that justiﬁes the assumption either that there are considerable numbers of
children living on the streets in the state or that the category of “stateless children”
can be elided with that of “street children.” A local academic study into street chil-
dren in the state was halted as most of the children thought to be street kids had
family and had not, as was assumed, been abandoned (Borneo Post, 2013). In 2015,
the Sabah Minister for Community Development and Consumer Affairs stated
that since 2007 there had been 1,557 street children housed in Kota Kinabalu Pro-
tection Homes, of whom 1,541 were subsequently claimed by their parents (New
Straits Times, 2015). This suggests that very few children are abandoned by their
migrant parents or forced to live on the streets and that the association stateless D
street ignores the fact that the majority of children at risk of statelessness are living
with their families, even if their parents are detained or deported. Kamilah, a 10-
year-old girl studying at a church-run learning center visited for this research, had
not seen her Indonesian parents for some time, as they were both being held in a
detention center. However, like many children of migrants, she had extensive fam-
ily links in the city and was being looked after by a grandmother and aunt. Simi-
larly, 10-year-old Azmir’s father had been deported to the Philippines, but Azmir
was cared for by other family members until his father was able to return to Sabah.
Public discourses on stateless children in Sabah associate such young people with the
category of “street children” in order to stigmatize them, to mark them as different, as
disruptive, as a public menace. This allows such children to be considered a kind of
anomaly, outside of the bounds of “normal” family life. Indeed, it even allows stateless
children to be located outside of the category of “real” children. If children are stateless
because they are on the streets, and if they are on the streets because their “illegal immi-
grant” parents have been deported or have abandoned them, then the moral responsi-
bility for this problem lies not with Sabah but with these parents and with the countries
to which such families “belong.” Given the reluctance by politicians and locals to
acknowledge statelessness as a genuine problem in Sabah, the ongoing conﬂation of
stateless and street children needs to be considered not as a sociological reality but as a
politically-motivatedmis-recognition.
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Discussion and conclusions
In a discussion of the exclusion of stateless Palestinians from UNHCR’s #IBelong
campaign, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh quotes the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’
comment that the Palestinians’ was a “very speciﬁc situation” that required a
“political solution” (2016, p. 306). Not only does Fiddian-Qasmiyeh critique the
language of “exceptionalism” that excluded Palestinians, she also argues that the
commissioner’s remark “depoliticizes other contexts of statelessness by suggesting
that these can readily be addressed through apolitical technical and legal mecha-
nisms” (2016, p. 306). This article has contributed to such critical work on the
(often unacknowledged) politics of statelessness by exploring the lack of political
will to seriously consider the existence and impact of statelessness in Sabah. As
Gibney (2014) makes clear, statelessness cannot only be understood from the per-
spective of international law but needs to be theorized politically so that we can
better understand the reasons why states might keep certain people stateless and
might reject their claims to belonging. In Malaysia, statelessness is entangled with
public anger about and political discourses on “illegal immigrants.” This is why,
despite the existence of legal provisions that should, theoretically (and certainly
according to the #IBelong campaign), prevent child statelessness, the ofﬁcial recog-
nition of stateless children is highly contested.
In Sabah, in a context of uncertain and shifting legal status, migrant families
adopt an attitude of documentary pragmatism, attaching no moral signiﬁcance to
legal identity, but attempting to escape irregularity through tactical acquisitions
and borrowings of documents. This attitude involves a preference for any form of
Malaysia-based documentation, such as an IMM13 card, even if such a document
places a person in legal limbo and in a position of potential statelessness. Following
other work on the connection between irregularity and statelessness (Redclift,
2013a, 2013b), it is possible to see these document acquisitions as “acts” of (noncit-
izen) citizenship (Isin & Nielsen, 2008) that stake a claim to membership. How-
ever, despite the necessity of acknowledging that the stateless can act as citizens,
and that statelessness is not only about exclusion (Redclift, 2013a, p. 6), it is impor-
tant not to be too optimistic about peoples’ abilities to act and to have a voice in a
context of profound vulnerability. If some migrant and refugee families can exer-
cise agency in acquiring documents, others seem to inhabit a position of documen-
tary hopelessness. Consider Rozita, the young, undocumented mother raising her
four children in a small wooden house by the sea. One afternoon, after returning
from work, Rozita sat with her children at a small outside table, drinking glasses of
orange Fanta and looking across the bay to new developments on the other shore.
She laughed and said, “I’ve never been anywhere else in Sabah. Just this place
here.” Then she added, “I don’t know how to get documents for my children. I
want to go to Immigration or the Police to ask them, but I am scared.”
Working informally at a school and raising her children in the state where she
was born, Rozita is clearly an “unrecognized citizen” in Gibney’s (2014) terms, a
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person who is not simply “excluded” but integrated in various ways into collective
life. Emphasizing her inclusion, even in the midst of documentary hopelessness, is
particularly important in outlining her “deep connections” (Gibney, 2014, p. 58) to
Sabah and her moral claims to membership. However, Rozita’s claims to member-
ship are not recognized by the state in which she lives. This is why, despite their
practical inclusions, she and her children also lack the right to have most rights:
the right to health care, the right to go to school, the right to travel without fear of
arrest. Whether or not Rozita and her children are de jure stateless (and they cer-
tainly seem to be prime candidates), it is not statelessness as such that has led to
their ambiguous marginalization but Sabah’s refusal to look past the “irregularity”
of their situation.
Contemporary theorizations of citizenship and statelessness have rightly
emphasized the “mutual recognition” that is at the heart of social inclusion (Som-
ers, 2008; Redclift, 2013a, 2013b). But what, exactly, does the failure of such recog-
nition involve? In her analysis of the victims of Hurricane Katrina, Somers gives
one account of such a failure, drawing attention to exclusion as a result of the suc-
cessful “contractualization” of citizenship in the United States (2008, p. 98). This
article, by contrast, has drawn attention to other ways in which mutual recognition
fails: the denial of the very existence of “stateless” people, together with the misre-
cognition of “stateless children” as “street children.” However, although, like Katri-
na’s victims, the potentially stateless residents of Sabah are thought, in local eyes,
to have little moral worth, they do, by contrast with those victims, have something
“to offer” (Somers, 2008, p. 89). What adults and children have to offer is a con-
stant, docile supply of undocumented labor for Sabah’s factories, shops, car washes,
timber yards, farms, and plantations.
This article has described how, in the RCI report on immigrants and unlawful
citizenship in Sabah, subdued acknowledgment was given to the long-suspected
Project IC, in which Muslim immigrants’ votes were apparently bought with
illicitly rapid citizenship. In response to this report, some Sabahan politicians have
recently put forward the idea of withdrawing all Malaysian identity cards issued in
the state and reissuing Sabah ICs (Carruthers, 2016, pp. 5–6). This Sabah IC would
only be available to “genuine Sabahans,” and the process of withdrawing previous
cards would presumably root out the “illegals” who have been falsely issued with
Malaysian ICs. Such a proposal has signiﬁcant ethical challenges, since it raises the
question of what should be done about the Sabah-born children and grandchildren
of those who pragmatically acquired Malaysian citizenship during Project IC
(Carruthers, 2016, p. 8). At a time when statelessness is high on the international
agenda, Sabahan politicians seem prepared to put further generations at risk of
statelessness. But is a child born and raised in Sabah less “genuinely” Sabahan if it
is revealed that her grandfather accepted Malaysian citizenship in return for his
vote in an election long ago?
The prospect of Sabahan ofﬁcials recalling all identity cards in order to verify
whether the holder is a “genuine” Sabahan illustrates the very real problems
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involved for irregular migrants and their families in becoming “visible.” Such prob-
lems, however, are underplayed in current campaigns against statelessness. Deter-
mining whether a person is a stateless person can never be a simply technical, legal
matter. If it were, more people would presumably pursue stateless determination
procedures, rather than fearing the consequences of making themselves visible to
state ofﬁcials. As this article has argued, statelessness cannot be approached as a
matter only of legal identity but must be understood alongside irregularity and in
the context of complex political and moral claims.
Notes
1. http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/what-does-it-mean-to-be-stateless/.
2. http://web.archive.org/web/20160212125740 and http://pmr.penerangan.gov.my/index.
php/info-terkini/19463-unjuran-populasi-penduduk-2015.html.
3. http://gregconstantine.photoshelter.com/gallery/The-Lost-Children-of-Sabah/
G0000R6usl3l9O10/.
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